This paper embeds the …nancial accelerator into a medium-scale DSGE model and estimates it using Bayesian methods. Incorporation of …nancial frictions enhances the model's description of the main macroeconomic aggregates. The …nancial accelerator accounts for approximately ten percent of monetary policy transmission. The model-consistent premium for external …nance compares well to observable proxies of the premium, such as the high-yield spread. Fluctuations in the external …nance premium are primarily driven by investment supply and monetary policy shocks. In terms of recession prediction, false signals of the premium can be given an economic interpretation.
Introduction
This paper incorporates the agency cost framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) into a DSGE model of the type analysed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2006) . We estimate the model on post-war US data using Bayesian techniques. We …rst assess whether …nancial frictions help in describing the main macroeconomic aggregates. We then quantify the contribution of the broad credit channel to the transmission of monetary policy (and other) shocks. From the model, we extract a time series of the external …nance premium. We discuss its relation to observable proxies of the premium and to shocks driving business cycles.
The reference model of contemporary business cycle research is the so-called New Keynesian or New Neoclassical Synthesis Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that a medium-scale version of this model is able to replicate the dynamic response of US macroeconomic aggregates to a monetary policy shock. Smets and Wouters (2003 , 2005 extend the model to a wider set of shocks and frictions, and -following Schorfheide (2000)-estimate it using Bayesian methods. Their results indicate that the current strand of DSGE models is able to compete on empirical grounds with purely data driven approaches, such as (Bayesian) VAR's. The present paper combines two observations related to the New Keynesian model. First, empirically, there is room for improvement in the standard model. In particular, Smets and Wouters (2006) document a relatively poor forecasting performance of the DSGE model with respect to investment. Second, theoretically, one maintained assumption in the prototypical New Keynesian model is that of frictionless capital markets. The seminal contribution of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and a number of subsequent calibration studies, most notably Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , document how relaxing the perfect capital market assumption can generate additional features observed in macroeconomic data.
Additionally, an enormous amount of microeconometric studies aims to quantify the extent of …nancial frictions to …rm investment (see, e.g., Hubbard 1998 and the references cited therein).
We complement this research from a macroeconomic point of view. Speci…cally, we estimate the external …nance premium, which is essentially unobservable, on the basis of macroeconomic data. Our approach provides a number of contributions relative to the microeconometric one. First, the model allows an interpretation of ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium in terms of shocks driving the economy. Second, from a historical perspective, data availability enables an investigation of the premium for the entire post-WWII period. Third, from a cross-sectional perspective, the model-consistent premium is exhaustive in coverage. By contrast, both micro estimates and readily available proxies of the external …nance premium typically focus on limited time periods or subsets of …rms, or both.
A number of related papers also take …nancial friction models to the data. Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) , on the one hand, exploit the microeconomic framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) . They estimate the underlying structural parameters using a sample of US …rms over the most recent business cycle. Subsequently, they analyse variations in the external …nance premium over time and …rms. On the other hand, a couple of papers subsume that a coherent macroeconomic framework can aid in the estimation of the magnitude of …nancial frictions. Meier and Müller (2006) estimate the elasticity of the premium in response to a monetary policy shock using minimum distance estimation. Christensen and Dib (2005) conduct a similar exercise using maximum likelihood techniques. The Bayesian approach enables a variety of model comparison exercises, as in Neri (2004) and Queijo (2005) , who measure the relative contribution of a number of frictions, including …nancial imperfections. The present paper also adresses credit market frictions from the macroeconomic point of view. However, we take the variety of real and nominal frictions for granted. Their importance has been established elsewhere, notably in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003 , 2005 , and the references cited therein. We do test the contribution of the …nancial accelerator relative to the standard model, but take the model one step further and analyse its implications for monetary policy transmission and the external …nance premium. These implications are interesting on their own, irrespective of whether the model delivers a better description of macroeconomic aggregates. In this respect, the interest of the paper is closer to the analysis of Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) than the aforementioned macroeconomic studies.
To anticipate our results, we …nd a substantial role for …nancial market imperfections. Incorporation of the …nancial accelerator further improves the prototypicial New Keynesian model's ability to mimic the dynamics of the main macroeconomic aggregates. Furthermore, we perform a quantitative assessment of the strength of the …nancial accelerator. Our …ndings suggest that, in terms of GDP, 10% of monetary policy transmission is due to the existence of …nancial market imperfections. The estimated steady state premium for external …nance in the US is 150 basis points. The premium exhibits a signi…cant negative reaction to changes in entrepreneurial net worth. We provide a model-consistent time series of the external …nance premium over the post-war period. Our estimate of the external …nance premium bears close resemblance to some observable indicators of …nancial distress. Moreover, historical ‡uctuations in the premium are driven primarily by investment supply shocks, and secondly, by monetary policy shocks. Finally, although the external …nance premium is generally a good predictor of recessions, supply shocks occasionaly have induced false predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the log-linearized version of the model. Section 3 discusses the estimation procedure and results. The paper then focuses on the implications for the …nancial accelerator (Section 4) and the external …nance premium (Section 5). Section 6 concludes. (2003), we introduce a …nancial intermediary, capital goods producers and entrepreneurs. Since these models are quite well-known, we refrain from a full-blown exposition of their …rst principles. To make the paper self-contained, this section presents the log-linearized version of the model that we estimate. For details, we refer the reader to the original papers.
Theoretical framework
Households maximize utility by trading o¤ current consumption with future consumption and current labor e¤ort. Aggregate consumptionĈ t evolves according to:
Apart from the standard terms in future consumption and the real interest rateR t (=R n t E t^ t+1 ), this particular consumption process derives from habit persistence (of the "catching-up with the Joneses" form) and non-separable utility in labor (L t ) and consumption. Consumption is more persistent for larger values of the habit parameter h. Moreover, for c > 1, there exists some complementarity between labor and consumption. The …nal term involving" B t represents a shock to the discount factor , a¤ecting intertemporal substitution decisions.
Households' labor supply is di¤erentiated which, in combination with partial indexation of non-reoptimized wages, gives rise to the following linearized wage equation: 
where is one plus the share of …xed costs in production, the capital share in the production function, and represents the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function.K t denotes capital andr k t its rental rate. Variation in total factor productivity is captured by"
Labor demand increases with the rental rate of capital and decreases with that of labor:
Similar to wages, non-reoptimized prices are partially ( p ) indexed to past in ‡ation. Due to Calvo-signals, each period only a fraction 1 p of …rms gets to reoptimize. The resulting in ‡ation dynamics are captured by the following process:
In an environment of price rigidity …rms will, in addition to current marginal costs (in square brackets), take into account expected future marginal costs, giving rise to the forward looking in‡ation term. The backward looking part follows from partial indexation. The term 
where is the depreciation rate,Î t stands for investment and" I t represents a shock to the investment technology. Investment dynamics are governed by:
whereQ t is the real value of installed capital and ' is the investment adjustment cost parameter.
Entrepreneurs buy the capital stock K t+1 from capital goods producers at a given price Q t , using both internal funds (net worth, N t+1 ) and loans from the bank. Subsequently, they transform it using their technology, decide on capital utilization and rent out capital services to intermediate goods …rms at a rater k t . The expected real return to capital is given by:
where R K denotes the steady state return to capital and similarly, r k the steady state rental rate.
Following the costly state veri…cation framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), however, entrepreneurs cannot borrow at the riskless rate. The cost of external …nance di¤ers from the risk-free rate because entrepreneurial output is unobservable from the point of view of the …nancial intermediary. In order to infer the realized return of the entrepreneur, the bank has to pay a (state veri…cation) cost. The bank monitors those entrepreneurs that default, pays the cost and seizes the remaining funds. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs borrow up to the point where the expected return to capital equals the cost of external …nance:
The parameter measures the elasticity of the external …nance premium to variations in entrepreneurial …nancial health. As shown explicitly in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the premium over the risk-free rate the …nancial intermediary demands is a negative function of the amount of collateralized net worth. The higher the entrepreneur's stake in the project, the lower the associated moral hazard. In case entrepreneurs have su¢ cient net worth to …nance the entire capital stock, agency problems vanish, the risk-free rate and the return to capital coincide, and the model reduces to the model of Smets and Wouters (2006) 1 .
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth accumulates according to:
where is the entrepreneurial survival rate and K N is the steady state ratio of capital to net worth (or the inverse leverage ratio) 2 .
1 One di¤erence with Smets and Wouters (2006) is the absence of an "equity premium shock" in our model.
They include this shock as a non-structural proxy for ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium. When we incorporate such a shock in the model with the …nancial accelerator, its variability is drawn to zero. 2 We rewrite the model without the bankruptcy cost ( ) and default threshold ( !) parameters of Bernanke et al. (1999) . There are a couple advantages related to conducting such a substitution. First, it allows one to refrain from assumptions about the distribution of idiosynchratic productivity shocks, as well as its parameters. Second,
The standard goods market equilibrium condition is augmented with terms capturing the costs of variable capital utilization and bankruptcy:
where c y and k y denote the steady state ratio of consumption and capital to output, and "
G t
can loosely be interpreted as a government spending shock.
As in Smets and Wouters (2003) the model is closed with the following empirical monetary policy reaction function:
Estimation strategy
The log-linearized version of the model is estimated using Bayesian methods. These methods use information from existing microeconometric and calibration evidence on behavioural parameters and update it with new information as captured by the likelihood. While estimation serves to increase the degree of dynamic …t of DSGE models it is not guaranteed to provide insight in the structural parameters of the underlying models. By contrast, purely calibration based approaches are unlikely to provide a good time-series characterization of the data relative to likelihood-based approaches. As stressed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) , the combination of prior and sample information into a posterior distribution provides a meaningful compromise between calibration and (likelihood-based) estimation.
We use the priors of Smets and Wouters (2006) for the parameters we share with their model 3 .
The last three columns of 
Parameter estimates
We present the …nancial accelerator parameter estimates in The estimates of the non-…nancial parameters are reported in the lower part of Table 1 and in   Table 2 . Overall, parameters that we share with Smets and Wouters (2006) Several diagnostics suggest the chain of posterior draws converges. In particular, after a su¢ ciently long burn-in period, the standardized CUMSUM statistic for all parameters ‡uctuates around the …nal estimate with a relative error of below 10%. Moreover, for each parameter, a test between the mean of the …rst 30% (after burn-in) and last 30% of draws never rejects the hypothesis of equality. This reinforces the evidence in favor of stability of the draws 6 . The algorithm attains an acceptance rate of 28%.
The Financial Accelerator
Starting in the early nineties, a vast body of research focuses attention to an examination of the relevance of the credit channel in monetary policy transmission. Most of the existing evidence investigates cross-sectional di¤erences in …rm investment and …nancing conditions (see, 5 As a robustness check, we change the prior mean of the elasticity to 0:07, in view of Christensen and Dib's (2005) estimate of 9%. In this case too, our point estimate for the elasticity is drawn towards 6%. 6 Moreover, di¤erent initializations of the chain converge to the same stationary distribution.
e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). While there is an awareness that credit frictions (can) a¤ect …rm investment, its economy-wide impact is largely unknown. This void follows from the microeconometric nature of these studies, which precludes a quantitative evaluation of the macroeconomic importance of the broad credit channel. We assess the contribution of …nancial frictions in two ways. We …rst measure the model's statistical performance relative to the standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Second, we document the contribution of the …nancial accelerator to the transmission of shocks.
As a measure of statistical comparative model performance, we compute the marginal density The response of output to both monetary policy shocks exhibits the prototypical acceleration e¤ect, as in the calibration of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Qualitatively, the additional e¤ect generated by the …nancial accelerator implies a signi…cant increase in the potence of monetary policy during the …rst ten to …fteen quarters following the shock. Quantitatively, the contribution of the …nancial accelerator to monetary policy transmission amounts to approximately 10% of the total output response 9 .
For the other shocks, the picture is somewhat more complicated. With respect to the three supply shocks, the …nancial accelerator ampli…es the immediate impact of a shock, yet reduces their medium term responses. After a number of periods, the output response to an investment supply shock becomes negative. The reason is that the subtantial fall in the price of capital (or 8 Conditional on credit frictions being absent, the values of and K N are irrelevant. In this case, they only contribute to the evolution of net worth, which is then immaterial. Moreover, the latter ratio is, by the ModiglianiMiller theorem, indeterminate. 9 More precisely, the average di¤erence in impulse responses over the …rst 20 quarters is 9% for in ‡ation objective and 11% for interest rate shocks.
rise in relative e¢ ciency of investment) advances the optimal timing of investment. Moreover, for this shock there is hardly any ampli…cation. This follows from the ensuing rise in the external …nance premium, mitigating the investment response. The increase in the premium is due to the reduction in net worth which, in turn, is caused by the fall in Q. The mild response of investment relative to the model without …nancial frictions also rationalizes its comovement with consumption. A stronger response of investment to " I would aggravate substitution e¤ects between investment and consumption.
We observe the mirror e¤ect of the …nancial accelerator on the output reaction following a government spending shock. Here, the impact e¤ect on output is small relative to the creditfrictionless response, albeit more persistent. Thus, depending on the particular shock under consideration, ampli…cation and persistence can both rise and fall due to the inclusion of the …nancial accelerator. In the estimated model, however, the presence of …nancial frictions does 
The external …nance premium
The previous section aimed to provide evidence of …nancial accelerator e¤ects in macroeconomic data. One of the reasons why macroeconomic evidence on …nancial frictions is scarse is because one of the central variables of these theories, viz. the external …nance premium, is unobservable.
In the present section, we …rst estimate the model-consistent premium. As a means of external validation, we then compare our estimate with a number of observable proxies of the premium.
Finally, we interpret movements in the premium in relation to shocks driving the business cycle. 
A time series of the premium

An external validation exercise
It is of interest to know to what extent our estimate relates to other indicators of the external …nance premium suggested in the literature. On the one hand, there are a number of readily available series that bear on the premium for external …nance. Among these, the most widely used are the prime spread (prime loan rate-federal funds rate) and the corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa). Gertler and Lown (1999) argue that in the last two decennia, the high-yield bond spread (<Bbb-Aaa) emerges as particularly useful indicator of the external …nance premium and …nancial conditions more generally. On the other hand, using microeconomic data on a sample of US …rms Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) provide an estimate of the premium over the most recent business cycle. Figure 3 plots these indicators joint with our estimate of the premium.
Only the prime and corporate bond spread are available over the entire sample period. Overall, the relation between our estimate and the former two series is rather weak. The correlations amount to 37% (corporate) and 20% (prime). Nevertheless, they share a number of important characteristics. For one, they all rise around the time of a recession. There is, however, a difference in timing, especially with respect to the prime spread, which lags a couple of quarters 10 .
Second, the hike in the mid-sixties that was not followed by a recession is observable in all three indicators. Similarly, the substantial decrease in the premium following the 1973-75 recession is also apparent. In the late eighties, with the emergence of a market for below investment grade corporate bonds, an additional indicator comes to the fore. Gertler and Lown (1999) show that the high-yield spread is strongly associated with both general …nancial conditions and the business cycle (as predicted by the …nancial accelerator). Along the lines of their arguments, we believe this spread to be a more thorough indicator of the external …nance premium, relative to the two proxies discussed above. In particular, the prime loan spread is a poor indication for …nancing conditions of …rms typically deemed vulnerable to …nancial frictions. It focuses on …rms of the highest credit quality, upon which …nancial constraints impinge the least. The (Baa-Aaa) corporate bond spread accounts for this discrepancy too some extent, by isolating developments speci…c to …rms that have a less solid …nancial status. Evidently, this argument holds a fortiori for the high-yield spread. As shown in Figure 3 , our estimate of the external …nance premium is closely related to this high-yield spread. Although our estimate misses most of the high frequency movements in the high-yield spread, the longer frequencies have more aligned patterns.
1 0 The lagging character of the prime spread is noticeable over the entire sample. The sluggish response of retail bank interest rates has spurred a vast amount of independent research. Due to the interest rate hikes in the early 70's, the rigidity of loan rates occasionaly resulted in negative spreads. Moreover, starting in 1994, the prime spread ceases to be a useful indicator of ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium. From then onwards the prime loan rate is set as the federal funds rate plus 3 percent.
As a rough approximation, our estimate almost envelopes the high-yield spread. The correlation between the two series is 68%. Finally, the graph also contains the premium as estimated by Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) . They estimate the premium on the basis of micro data by exploiting the microeconomic friction underlying the model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) . As in the case of the high-yield spread, its behaviour and relation to our estimate of the premium are very similar. Given the enormous di¤erence in empirical approach this similarity is somewhat surprising, yet comforting.
In conclusion, our estimate of the premium for external …nance seems to have a substantial realistic content. It is closely related to readily available proxies of the premium. Using macroeconomic data we establish roughly the same behaviour of the premium as Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004), who estimate …rm-level premia. Due to the span of the data in the present analysis, however, we are able to generalize these properties over a more comprehensive set of economic cycles. One advantage of our estimate relative to the indicators suggested in the literature is its coverage. By estimating the premium on the basis of macroeconomic data, it should cover the entirety of US …rms. By contrast, other indicators typically pertain to a speci…c subset of …rms 11 . Another advantage follows from distilling the premium out of a full- ‡edged DSGE model. Hence, one can interpret movements in the premium in relation to structural shocks driving the economy, as the next section illustrates. First, it seems that investment supply shocks are the primary source of ‡uctuations in the premium. In the short run investment supply shocks account for about half to two-thirds of the forecast error variance of the premium. At longer horizons, this percentage increases to around 90%. The historical decomposition of the premium in Figure 4 con…rms that investment supply shocks are responsible for the bulk of variations in the external …nance premium. The graph traces the low frequency component of the premium very closely. Not only for the premium, but also for the business cycle the role of investment supply shocks is substantial. We …nd that the contribution of these shocks to GDP ranges from a lower bound of 13% (at long horizon) to an upper bound of 34% (immediate). This is somewhat higher than in Smets and Wouters (2006) and is more in line with the …ndings of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) . They attribute up to 30% of business cycle ‡uctuations to these shocks. Moreover, the substantial increases in the premium due to " I in the second half of the sample are consistent with the increased role of technological investment since the mid-seventies (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997).
Decomposing the premium
Second, monetary policy shocks also cause a great deal of movements in the premium. Table 3 shows that the in ‡ation objective and monetary policy shock jointly account for 10 to 35% of the short run ‡uctuations of the premium. Importantly, the model interprets the early eighties surge in the premium as being largely driven by the Fed's disin ‡ationary policy. The corresponding recession is also attributed to the stance of monetary policy, as is evident from the historical decomposition of GDP. Following the 2001 recession, favorable monetary policy shocks have contributed to the reduction of the external …nance premium.
Third, we also …nd a small, yet signi…cant contribution of preference shocks (4 12%) to the short horizon variance decomposition of the premium. Another minor portion (6% on average) of the high frequency movements in the premium is generated by labor supply shocks. Government spending as wel as both mark-up shocks have only minor e¤ects on the premium. The price and wage mark-up shocks also have a small e¤ect on output ‡uctuations. The government spending shock, by contrast, generates most of the short horizon and a substantial part of the long horizon variance of GDP.
Finally, historical contributions can also shed light on the leading indicator properties of the external …nance premium. In particular, consider the peaks in the external …nance premium during the early …fties and mid-sixties in Figure 2 . These peaks did not signal a recession.
Historical decompositions can provide insight into these episodes, which would be labelled "false signals" from a forecasting perspective. The surge in the premium in 1950 is driven almost entirely by positive investment supply shocks, as shown by the second peak in its contribution in Figure 4 . The increase in the second half of the sixties is mainly the result of increases in total factor productivity. Both these shocks induce a positive correlation between GDP and the external …nance premium. The reason is that the borrowing needs of …rms ultimately rise. After a productivity shock, for instance, the increase in investment opportunities surmounts the rise in private net worth. While the premium rises consequently, this does not prevail the substantial positive output response, thus creating the false signal. In addition, the favorable business cycle stance during these episodes was supported by positive contributions of government spending and -too a lesser extent-price mark-up shocks. Both these shocks have limited e¤ects on the premium. 
Conclusion
